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The Inscrutability of Colour Similarity 
This paper presents a new response to the colour similarity argument, an argument that many 
people take to pose the greatest threat to colour physicalism. Very roughly, the argument 
claims that the colours could not be type-identical to surface reflectance properties, because 
reflectances seemingly fail to stand in the same characteristic similarity relations as the 
colours. After setting out the argument in more detail in Section 1, Section 2 presents an 
initial challenge to standard formulations of the argument. As authors such as Quine and 
Lewis have noted, the similarity relation exhibits extreme context sensitivity. Most 
presentations of the colour similarity argument fail to control for such contextual variation, 
however, which raises the distinct possibility that the argument equivocates on the similarity 
relation across its premises. Although this challenge is ultimately inconclusive, it forces a 
significant reformulation of the argument and thereby highlights the need for much greater 
care and precision in presenting claims about colour similarity. 
My main response to the argument focuses on features of our knowledge of facts 
about colour similarity. The colour similarity argument depends for its cogency on the 
assumption that if colour physicalism is true, then colour similarities should be evident or 
scrutable under standard physical descriptions of reflectance properties such as their spectral 
reflectance curves. Without this assumption, the fact that ordinary colour similarities are not 
evident under such presentations provides no conclusive reason to reject colour physicalism. 
In Section 4 I argue that the colour physicalist should reject this assumption and endorse the 
inscrutability of colour similarity. This strategy is motivated in Section 5 by parallels 
between the colour similarity argument and the explanatory gap between mind and body 
made vivid by Jackson’s (1986) knowledge argument, and in particular by so-called type-B 
 physicalist responses to that argument. The response is further motivated in Section 6 by 
cases in chemistry and biochemistry in which analogous scrutability theses fail to hold. 
1. The Colour Similarity Argument: An Initial Formulation 
Colour physicalism is the view that colours are type-identical to surface spectral reflectance 
properties.1 Surface reflectances are dispositions to reflect incident light at varying 
wavelengths. Reflectances feature prominently in optics, the physics of light and its 
interaction with matter. The canonical way to represent an object’s reflectance is by its 
reflectance spectrum or spectral reflectance curve, which charts the proportion of incident 
light reflected from its surface at all wavelengths in the visible spectrum. Figure 1 shows the 
reflectance curves for paradigmatic blue, purple, and green objects. 
 
The best known form of colour physicalism does not identify the colours with super 
determinate reflectances but rather with anthropocentric classes or sets of reflectances known 
as reflectance-types. This is intended to handle the existence of metamers, objects with 
sometimes widely differing reflectance properties that can be visually matched in respect of 
1 Hilbert (1987), Byrne & Hilbert (2003). As standard in debates about colour ontology, I shall limit discussion 
to the hues and ignore aspects of colour such as saturation and lightness; see Byrne & Hilbert (2003: 14). 
Fig. 1: Reproduced (with permission) from Byrne & Hilbert (2003: 13) 
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 colour under some illumination conditions.2 Despite their largely anthropocentric interest, 
reflectance-types are nonetheless ontologically independent of perceiving subjects, as Byrne 
& Hilbert (2003: 11) point out, 
 
The reflectance-types that we identify with the colours will be quite uninteresting 
from the point of view of physics or any other branch of science unconcerned with the 
reactions of human perceivers. This fact does not, however, imply that these 
categories are unreal or somehow subjective... It is just a plain matter of fact that an 
object has a particular type of reflectance, and this fact need not depend in any 
interesting way on the existence of creatures with colour vision. 
 
While reflectance-types are therefore, in a sense, interest-relative properties, this does not 
imply that they are metaphysically constituted by relations between objects and the 
characteristic colour experiences of normal subjects, or by dispositions to produce such 
experiences.3 
 Colour physicalism has some very attractive features. Perhaps most importantly, it 
preserves our default or naive view of colour ontology, which involves a commitment to 
some sort of objective realism. As Kalderon (2007: 569) remarks, ‘we tend to conceive of the 
colours as mind independent qualities of material objects. We should not revise our 
2 Byrne & Hilbert (2003: 10-11). Colour physicalists such as Hilbert (1987), Armstrong (1978), and Smart 
(1987) consider super determinate reflectances to be colours proper. This view entails that determinable 
categories such as red are strictly speaking not colours but rather classes of colours. For discussion of colour 
categorisation and its relationship to colour vision, see my ‘Colour Vision and Seeing Colours’ (ms.). 
3 See Byrne & Hilbert (1997: xx-xxii) for a brief overview of dispositionalist theories of colour. Cohen (2009: 
Ch. 8.1) discusses the contrast between dispositionalist and functionalist theories of colour. Briefly, realiser 
forms of colour functionalism use subject-involving descriptions or functional roles to fix the reference of 
colour terms on their physical realisers, with which the colours are deemed strictly identical (Jackson 1998; 
McLaughlin 2000). If these realisers turn out to be surface reflectances, and if the relevant identities are type 
rather than token identities, then realiser functionalism will end up looking very much like the colour 
physicalist’s type-identity theory of colour. See Cohen (2009: 187-188), and compare Braddon-Mitchell & 
Jackson (1996) on realiser functionalism as a route to the identity theory of mind. In contrast, role functionalism 
takes colours to be identical with subject-involving functional roles (Cohen 2009: Ch. 7). Given the role played 
by subject responses in individuating colour properties, role functionalism is not in my view a form of colour 
physicalism. See Cohen (2003: §2) for contrasting discussion. 
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 commitment to the existence of the colours, so conceived, without compelling reason.’ While 
it is by no means the only available form of objective realism, colour physicalism is a 
reductive and ontologically parsimonious view that identifies the colours with well 
understood and clearly efficacious properties of the surfaces of objects. An attendant virtue of 
the view is that it avoids convicting subjects of global perceptual error in visually attributing 
colour properties to ordinary objects. According to colour physicalism, colour vision involves 
typically (or at least often) veridical perception of genuine physical properties of objects in 
the environment. 
Despite the evident appeal, it is extremely difficult to reconcile colour physicalism 
with three important structural features of the colours. First, some hues are binary, in the 
sense that they are composite in nature: shades of orange, for example, always have both a 
reddish and yellowish component. In contrast, some hues are unique in that they are not 
composite but rather unitary or pure in nature. There exist shades of yellow, for example, 
which have absolutely no reddish or greenish component. Second, some hues bear opponent 
relations to one another, in the sense that they ‘cancel each other out’ and cannot together 
form components of a binary hue.4 Third, the colours stand in various characteristic similarity 
relations. For example, it is characteristic of red that it is more similar to orange than green, 
and likewise of scarlet that it is more similar to fire engine red than vermilion. These 
structural features form the basis for the colour structure argument, which was introduced to 
the contemporary literature by Hardin (1988).  This argument is generally taken to pose the 
greatest threat to colour physicalism.5 The basic thrust of the argument is that none of the 
4 The locus classicus for opponent colour theory is Hering (1920/1964). See also Hardin (1988: 26, 30, 37-39, 
52). The opponent hue pairings are red and green, and yellow and blue. It is important to recognise that the 
terms ‘composite’ and ‘component’ do not imply that binary hues are physically constituted by mixtures of 
different hues. See Byrne & Hilbert (2008) for relevant discussion. 
5 On the seriousness of the threat, see McLaughlin (2003: 111), Byrne & Hilbert (2003: 7), and Pautz (2006: 
536). The colour structure argument is presented and endorsed by Maund (1995: 42, 141), Thompson (1995: 
128-130, 135-139), Clark (1996: 145-146), and Pautz (2006). Boghossian & Velleman (1991) and Johnston 
(1992) offer epistemological versions of the argument.  
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 aforementioned structural properties seems to be shared by surface reflectance properties, 
which provides strong reason to doubt that reflectances are the colours as colour physicalism 
claims. It is worth noting that parallel arguments threaten to undermine reductive physicalist 
accounts of other sensible qualities such as smells and tastes. The arguments of this paper, if 
sound, therefore will have much wider significance beyond the philosophy of colour. 
Cohen (2003: 81) presents the standard formulation of the colour structure argument 
as follows, 
 
The argument... is a simple instance of Leibniz’s law: colours have these structural 
properties, and therefore any set of properties that is identical with the colours must 
have them as well. However, it is suggested, the only plausible candidates proposed 
by [colour physicalists] for being identical with the colours lack the structural 
properties in question, and therefore the purported identities cannot be sustained.  
 
Here I shall be focusing on the similarity component of this argument, which can be 
unpacked as follows: 
1. Blue= Rb, purple= Rp and green= Rg (Colour Physicalism) 
2. Blue is more similar to purple than green (Colour Similarity) 
3. If blue= Rb, purple= Rp and green= Rg, then blue is more similar to purple than 
green iff Rb is more similar to Rp than Rg (Leibniz’s Law) 
4. Rb is not more similar to Rp than Rg (Reflectance Dissimilarity) 
5. Therefore, Colour Physicalism is false. 
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 Suppose that colour physicalism claims that blue is type-identical with reflectance-type Rb, 
purple with Rp, and green with Rg. From our visual experience of colour, it seems obvious 
that blue is more similar to purple than green. By Leibniz’s Law, if colour physicalism is 
true, then this colour similarity holds just in case the reflectances Rb, Rp, and Rg stand in the 
corresponding similarity relation. The problem, however, is that given everything we know 
about these reflectance properties from optics, there simply seems to be no evidence that Rb, 
Rp, and Rg stand in the required similarity relation. The representations of these properties in 
Figure 1 provide a seemingly compelling illustration of this fact: as Pautz (2006: 539) 
remarks, ‘the case for [Reflectance Dissimilarity] is that it is obvious when we look at [these] 
reflectance curves’ that Rb, Rp, and Rg do not stand in the right similarity relation. Colour 
Similarity, Reflectance Dissimilarity, and Colour Physicalism thus form an inconsistent triad, 
and the argument concludes that Colour Physicalism ought to be rejected. 
2. The Context Challenge: Reformulating the Argument 
One challenge to the colour similarity argument which to my knowledge has not yet been 
explored is to question the validity of the argument on the grounds of a probable equivocation 
on the similarity relation across premises 2 and 4, Colour Similarity and Reflectance 
Dissimilarity. An analogy will help to illustrate this challenge. Suppose that I encounter a 
larger than average mouse in my kitchen and utter the following, 
6. That mouse is big. 
I then ponder the following identity claim, 
7. That mouse=that animal. 
I know by Leibniz’s Law that, 
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 8. If that mouse=that animal, then that mouse is big iff that animal is big. 
Knowing what I know about animals, however, I confidently assert, 
9. That animal is not big. 
Presented with the inconsistent triad of 6, 7, and 9, I conclude that that mouse≠that animal. 
My reasoning here exactly mirrors that of the colour similarity argument, but in this case it 
seems clear that something has gone seriously awry. The problem here surely is not the 
absence of identity, but rather the tacit assumption that the predicate ‘big’ is semantically 
univocal across premises 6 and 9. A far more plausible diagnosis is that the change from a 
mouse-y context in 6 to an animal-y context in 9 shifts the interpretation of the predicate 
‘big’, and that the argument therefore turns on an equivocation.6 
Extending this thought to the colour similarity argument, the colour physicalist could 
argue that the change from an ordinary colour context in Colour Similarity to a reductive 
reflectance context in Reflectance Dissimilarity is likely to shift the interpretation of the 
similarity relation. Note that the likelihood of such contextual variation is all that is needed to 
get this challenge up and running, as this would establish a burden of proof on advocates of 
the argument to eliminate that possibility. Why think that such contextual variation is likely 
in this case? A quite general reason is that similarity relations are notoriously context 
sensitive, as Lewis observes (1986: 254-255),7 
 
6 One plausible explanation is that the different terms shift the comparison class for the predicate from mice to 
elephants: whereas that mouse is big {for a mouse}, that elephant is not big {for an elephant}. See Kennedy 
(2007). 
7 Goodman (1970: 444) likewise argues that similarity, like motion, requires a frame of reference. Empirical 
studies confirm the extreme variability of ordinary judgements of similarity. Medin, Goldstone, & Gentner 
(1993: 271) report experiments which ‘show similarity to be dynamic and context dependent’. Murphy & Medin 
(1985: 296) say that ‘the relative weighting of a feature... varies with the stimulus context and task, so that there 
is no unique answer to the question of how similar is one object to another’. See also Barsalou (1982) and 
Tversky (1977).  
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 Many different relations, some more stringent and some less, some stressing some 
respects of comparison and others stressing others, have a claim to be called 
“similarity”. The exact meaning of... “similar” is neither constant nor determinate... I 
can say that Ted and Fred are very much alike, yet very different. Uniform resolutions 
[of these similarity relations] would make that a contradiction – so much the worse for 
them! 
 
Adapting Lewis’s reasoning, the context challenge holds that we can truly say that certain 
colours (qua colours) are very much alike, as in Colour Similarity, and yet that those very 
colours (qua reflectances) are very different, as in Reflectance Dissimilarity. Uniform 
interpretations of the similarity relation would imply an inconsistency with colour 
physicalism – but then so much the worse for the assumption that these relations are to be 
uniformly interpreted! 
A second reason to suspect that different notions of similarity are operating in Colour 
Similarity and Reflectance Dissimilarity is that these premises differ in their use of non-
reductive and reductive terms, respectively, in referring to the colours. Co-referring terms are 
often associated with different systems of theoretical classification, description, and 
explanation, and these systems in turn often invoke different standards for comparative 
similarity. Here is Quine (1969/1999: 238) on this point, 
 
[A] taxonomic example is the grouping of kangaroos, opossums, and marsupial mice 
in a single kind, marsupials, while excluding ordinary mice. By primitive standards 
the marsupial mouse is more similar to the ordinary mouse than to the kangaroo; by 
theoretical standards the reverse is true. 
 
The context response likewise holds that despite the putative type-identity of blue and Rb, the 
terms ‘blue’ and ‘Rb’ are associated with different systems of classifying the colours – the 
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 ordinary folk classificatory system, on the one hand, and the scientific classificatory system 
of optics, on the other. Moreover, these different classificatory systems have different 
associated, proprietary, standards for comparative similarity, such that while it is true 
according to the first set of standards to say that blue is more similar to purple than green, it is 
not true according to the second, more refined theoretical set of standards to say that Rb is 
more similar to Rp than Rg. The colour physicalist thus could grant the truth of both Colour 
Similarity and Reflectance Dissimilarity, but resist the conclusion of the colour similarity 
argument on the grounds of equivocation on the similarity relation across these premises. 
 The idea that different terms for the same colour can be associated with different 
standards for comparative similarity is interestingly related to a feature of Lewis’s (1986) 
counterpart theory.8 According to counterpart theory, different names for the same object can 
have different associated counterpart relations. As a consequence, modal sentences of the 
form ┌ ◊Fa ┐ and ┌ ◊Fb ┐ can differ in truth value even when a=b. Let ‘Goliath’ refer to the 
statue and ‘Lumpl’ refer to the lump of clay from which the statue is made. Now consider a 
counterfactual world w in which the statue has been deconstructed and the clay put to some 
other use. 
10. Lumpl would have survived in w. 
11. Goliath would not have survived in w. 
 12. Therefore, Lumpl ≠ Goliath. 
This argument is not valid on counterpart theory because the names ‘Lumpl’ and ‘Goliath’ 
have different associated counterpart relations. For Lewis this means that the names have 
different associated transworld similarity relations, for counterpart relations are defined in 
8 Here I am extremely indebted to personal correspondence with Adam Pautz, who brought to my attention the 
comparison with counterpart theory. 
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 terms of similarity (1986: 256, n.40). Now, while I am by no means recommending that the 
colour physicalist endorse counterpart theory, the above account is analogous in claiming that 
different terms for the same property can be associated with different similarity relations, on 
account of their being associated with different systems of theoretical classification. The 
context challenge thus claims that while the terms ‘blue’ and ‘Rb’ represent the very same 
property (de re, no less), each term is associated with a different similarity relation and hence 
the inference from Colour Similarity and Reflectance Dissimilarity to the falsity of colour 
physicalism is invalid. 
Although the context challenge opens up interesting lines of discussion, I do not think 
that it provides a conclusive response to the colour similarity argument. This is because 
advocates of the argument can reply simply by making the argument more precise, thereby 
eliminating the possibility of contextual variation. One such reformulation would run as 
follows: 
 1*. 'Blue is more similar to purple than green' as said by S in w at t is true. (Colour 
 Similarity*) 
 2*.'Blue is more similar to purple than green' as said by S in w at t is true iff <blue, 
 purple, green> satisfies the relation X that is the semantic value of 'x is more similar to 
 y than z' as said by S in w at t. (Simple Truth Conditions) 
 3*. If colour physicalism is true, then 'blue is more similar to purple than green' as 
 said by S in w at t is true iff <Rb, Rp, Rg> satisfies this relation X. 
 4*. <Rb, Rp, Rg> does not satisfy this relation X. (Reflectance Dissimilarity*) 
 5*. Therefore, if colour physicalism is true, then 'blue is more similar to purple than 
 green' as said by S in w at t is false. 
10 
 
  6*. Therefore, colour physicalism is false.9 
By stipulating a univocal interpretation of the similarity relation, this formulation of the 
similarity argument seemingly eliminates the risk of contextual variation. This comes at the 
cost of a degree of artificiality arising from the metalinguistic ascent, but this nonetheless 
seems like the right way for my opponent to go. Despite the availability of this reply, the 
context challenge brings to light two important interim conclusions. First, the standard 
Leibniz’s Law formulation of the colour similarity argument is inadequate and should be 
avoided due to its failure to control for contextual variations in the similarity relation. 
Second, and more generally, all parties to this debate need to be far more cautious and precise 
when making claims about colour similarity. The similarity relation is a slippery customer 
and needs to be handled with care. 
3. The Experiential Response 
What options does this leave the colour physicalist? Denying Colour Similarity* presumably 
should be a last resort. As noted above, one of the main attractions of colour physicalism is 
its thoroughgoing realism about the colours, and it would be a huge disappointment if the 
view could only be sustained by adopting an error theory about colour similarity claims (and 
likewise for other aspects of colour structure). A more promising strategy would be to deny 
Simple Truth Conditions. The popular experiential response, for example, claims that 
ordinary colour similarity claims are not made true by similarities among the colours after all, 
but rather by similarities among our visual experiences of colour; more precisely, by 
similarities among the phenomenal characters of these experiences.10 Taking the value of 
9 This formulation of the argument is essentially the same as that presented by Pautz (2006: 540). Thanks to an 
anonymous referee for stressing the need to restructure the argument in this way. 
10 Shoemaker (1991), Lewis (1997: 339-340), McLaughlin (2003), Cohen (2003, 2009).  
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 E(x) to be the type of phenomenal character of experiences typically caused by x, premise 2* 
is replaced by the following: 
2**. 'Blue is more similar to purple than green' as said by S in w at t is true iff 
<E(blue), E(purple), E(green)> satisfies the relation X that is the semantic value of the 
relation 'x is more similar to y than z' as said by S in w at t. 
And in place of premises 3* and 4* we now have, 
3**. If colour physicalism is true, then 'blue is more similar to purple than green' as 
said by S in w at t is true iff <E(Rb), E(Rp), E(Rg)> satisfies this relation X. 
?? 4**. <E(Rb), E(Rp), E(Rg)> does not satisfy this relation X. 
The colour similarity argument now can be easily defused, for 4** seems quite implausible. 
Whereas the reflectance curves for Rb, Rp, and Rg suggest that these properties do not stand in 
the same similarity relations as blue, purple, and green, there is no good reason to deny that 
the phenomenal characters E(Rb), E(Rp), and E(Rg) bear the right similarities. 
 The experiential response has significant appeal. First, it avoids an error theory about 
colour similarity claims, preserving the truth of our ordinary thought and talk about the 
colours. Second, the response captures the extremely plausible thought that colour similarities 
(and other aspects of colour structure such as uniqueness of hue) surely depend in some sense 
on the nature of our visual systems.11 According to the experiential response, the dependence 
is metaphysical or constitutive: on this view, despite superficial linguistic appearances to the 
contrary, colour similarity facts just are facts about the qualitative characters of our visual 
experiences of colour. As Pautz (2006: 554) usefully notes, the experiential response thus 
11 Shoemaker (2003: 256). 
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 couples a physicalist or subject-independent account of first-order colour properties with a 
dispositionalist or subject-dependent account of second-order facts about colour structure. 
 For all its promise, however, the experiential response has extremely unattractive 
epistemic, linguistic, and metaphysical consequences. First, the response presents an 
unappealing view of the epistemology of colour structure facts. The fact that blue is more 
similar to purple than green seems to be a paradigmatic example of something that we learn 
by visually perceiving – visually representing, or being visually presented with – the colours. 
According to the experiential response, however, this fact actually must be learned by 
introspecting and attending to the qualitative character of our visual experiences of colour, 
rather than the colour properties themselves. Second, by denying Simple Truth Conditions the 
experiential response implies that ordinary language colour similarity claims do not predicate 
relations among the colours, as we pretheoretically think that they do, but rather as holding 
among our experiences of the colours. As Pautz (2006: 541) notes, on this view ‘the claims in 
question do not really say what they seem to say’. A third and related metaphysical worry is 
that the experiential response thus seems to locate colour similarity facts in the wrong 
place.12 Byrne (2003: 645) expresses this concern as follows, 
 
Intuitively, [the experiential response] gets things the wrong way round. If we have 
opinions at all about salient similarities... holding between our colour experiences, 
that is surely because we take such similarities to be induced by the apparent 
similarities between the colours. Why is the experience as of a teal object similar to 
the experience as of a turquoise object? Because teal is similar to turquoise. 
 
12 Lewis (1997: 330) seems happy to bite this bullet, remarking that ‘we might have had an offhand opinion that 
these relations originated as relations among surface properties. If so, we were wrong.’ 
13 
 
                                                 
 The experiential response thus fails to respect the plausible physicalist supervenience thesis 
that there could be no difference in colour similarities without a difference in the underlying 
physical nature of the colours themselves. Taken together, these issues spell serious trouble 
for the experiential response and another strategy therefore is required. 
4. The Inscrutability of Colour Similarity 
The last remaining option for the colour physicalist is to deny Reflectance Dissimilarity*, the 
claim that the reflectances Rb, Rp, and Rg do not stand in the ‘right’ similarity relation X, 
whatever exactly that might be.13 There are two approaches that one could take in denying 
this premise. The first, direct, approach would be to propose some specific interpretation of X 
such that a) X is a plausible candidate for the semantic value of ‘similar’ in the mouths of 
ordinary folk when they make colour similarity claims, and b) X is evidently satisfied by <Rb, 
Rp, Rg>. Colour physicalists have been united in their scepticism about the prospects for this 
direct approach. Byrne and Hilbert (2003: 13) observe that ‘there does not seem to be an 
obvious respect in which the [‘blue’] reflectance-type is more similar to the [‘purple’ type] 
than it is to the [‘green’ type]’, and Byrne (2003: 648) goes so far as to conclude that ‘we can 
be completely confident that any plausible physicalist candidates for the colours do not stand 
in the required genuine similarity relations’. 
 The prospects for denying Reflectance Dissimilarity* might therefore seem rather 
bleak. This is to overlook a second, indirect, approach, however, which is to question the 
motivation for Reflectance Dissimilarity* provided by advocates of the colour similarity 
argument. As with Reflectance Dissimilarity, Reflectance Dissimilarity* is motivated by the 
13 There might initially seem to be some tension between this response and the context challenge explored 
above. Whereas the context challenge granted the truth of both Colour Similarity and Reflectance Dissimilarity, 
the response now under consideration involves denying Reflectance Dissimilarity*. There is in fact no formal 
tension here, however, because the whole point of the context challenge was that Reflectance Dissimilarity and 
Colour Similarity involved different similarity relations, and that Reflectance Dissimilarity thus did not have the 
truth conditions specified in Reflectance Dissimilarity*. 
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 observation that when we examine standard scientific representations of the reflectances Rb, 
Rp, and Rg such as the reflectance spectra presented in Figure 1, there does not seem to be any 
obvious sense in which Rb is more similar to Rp than Rg. Given what we know about 
reflectances from optics – and let’s just suppose that this includes everything that could 
possibly be relevant to understanding the physical nature of these properties – we simply 
have no reason to think that Rb, Rp, and Rg stand in the required similarity relation. 
 It is crucial to note, however, that this observation only provides compelling reason to 
accept Reflectance Dissimilarity* if we assume that if colour physicalism were true, then the 
colour similarities that are evident in ordinary visual perception also should be evident under 
standard scientific representations of the corresponding reflectance-types. In other words, 
Reflectance Dissimilarity* depends for its cogency on the following scrutability thesis: 
Scrutability: If colour physicalism is true, then if blue is more similar to purple than 
green, then it should be possible to acquire knowledge that Rb is more similar to Rp 
than Rg under standard physical presentations or descriptions of these reflectances. 
The role of this scrutability assumption in the colour similarity argument is highlighted by 
Byrne (2003: 642, fn. 5),14 
 
The argument from similarity assumes that if physicalism about colour is true, then 
any genuine respects of similarity between the colours will be evident at the level of 
the canonical physical description of those properties. Absent this assumption, the 
failure of colour science to find the appropriate genuine respects of similarity would 
not show that such respects did not exist, thus blocking the argument. 
 
14 Strictly speaking, Byrne (2003) is discussing an epistemological version of the argument, but his point also 
applies here given that the stated motivation for Reflectance Dissimilarity* clearly depends on the assumption 
that colour similarities ought to be evident at the level of physical descriptions of reflectance properties. 
15 
 
                                                 
 To put this point another way, the argument rests on the assumption that endorsing colour 
physicalism requires facts about colour similarities to be physical facts, that is, facts that 
would be evident to anyone provided only with the descriptive and explanatory resources of 
the relevant reducing theory, which in this case would be optics. As Byrne notes, without this 
assumption, the fact that it is not immediately evident from their reflectance spectra that Rb is 
more similar to Rp than Rg would not decisively establish that this similarity did not in fact 
obtain, thus undercutting the desired support for Reflectance Dissimilarity*. 
 To be clear, then, my proposal is that the colour physicalist should reject Scrutability, 
thus taking an indirect approach to resisting Reflectance Dissimilarity*. Let’s call this the 
inscrutability response. The claim is that, contrary to initial appearances, the reflectance-
types Rb, Rp, and Rg do in fact stand in the same similarity relations as blue, purple, and 
green, and that Reflectance Dissimilarity* therefore is false. The reason why Reflectance 
Dissimilarity* seems true is that these similarities are not scrutable from standard, canonical, 
scientific presentations of reflectances such as their reflectance spectra.15 Quite reassuringly, 
the inscrutability response thus explains the unavailability of the direct approach to denying 
Reflectance Dissimilarity*. It is precisely because of the inscrutability of colour similarity 
that it is, in the end, futile to expect a direct or explicit account in physical terms as to how 
‘Rb is more similar to Rp than Rg’ comes out true on the colour physicalist’s view. 
It is perhaps helpful to think of the inscrutability response as the epistemic analogue 
of the context challenge. The context challenge held that attributions of similarities among 
the colours can be true as interpreted in ordinary linguistic contexts (as in Colour Similarity) 
and false as interpreted in reductive scientific contexts (as in Reflectance Dissimilarity). 
Somewhat analogously, the inscrutability response claims that some facts about colour 
15 For recent discussion of a wide range of scrutability theses and their relationship to physicalism, see Chalmers 
(2012). Unfortunately, limitations of space dictate that I cannot engage with Chalmers’ work on this topic here. 
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 similarity are knowable or evident in some epistemic contexts (exercising our ordinary colour 
vision capacities would be a paradigm example, but presumably we can also come to know 
such facts via reliable testimony, graphical representations of the colour space, and so on), 
but not knowable in other epistemic contexts (examining theoretical descriptions of 
reflectances in optics being the crucial case in point). 
In what follows, I shall motivate and develop the inscrutability response first by 
considering some parallel moves that have been made in response to the mind-body problem, 
and then by examining some cases from chemistry and biochemistry in which related 
scrutability theses fail to hold. These philosophical and empirical precedents should, in the 
end, demonstrate both the viability and attractiveness of the inscrutability response as a 
defence against the colour similarity argument. 
5. The Mind-Body Problem 
In order to provide some context and motivation for the inscrutability response, I want to 
highlight an analogous physicalist solution to the mind-body problem. A common way to 
think about the mind-body problem is as presenting an explanatory gap between mind and 
body, the mental and the physical. Very roughly the thought is that there is something so 
peculiarly subjective or first-personal about phenomenal consciousness that it seems that one 
could never provide a fully adequate account or explanation of the distinctive nature of 
conscious states within a purportedly objective or third-personal scientific theory of the brain. 
One of the most vivid illustrations of this putative gap is provided by Jackson’s (1986) 
knowledge argument. As I assume will be familiar, Mary is assumed to have encyclopaedic 
knowledge of neuroscience, in particular the neural facts concerning the visual processing of 
colour. For all her neuroscientific knowledge, however, Mary in her black and white room 
seemingly lacks any knowledge as to the phenomenal character of visual experiences as of 
17 
 
 red: when Mary leaves her room and sees red for the first time, it seems intuitive (to many) to 
think that she learns a new fact concerning the qualitative nature of her colour experience, 
that is, concerning what it’s like to undergo an experience as of red. Given that ex hypothesi 
Mary already has knowledge of all the relevant physical facts concerning visual processing, it 
is supposed to follow that the fact that Mary learns regarding her experience as of red is a 
non-physical fact. 
As is widely recognised, the anti-physicalist conclusion of the knowledge argument 
only follows given an assumption about the scrutability of mental facts from physical facts. 
To be clear, the assumption is that if physicalism about the mental were true, then Mary 
would be able to acquire the relevant piece of psychological knowledge in her black and 
white room, equipped only with her knowledge of neuroscientific facts, plus her apriori 
deductive capacities. In the jargon, those that accept this scrutability assumption but deny the 
conclusion of the knowledge argument are known as type-A physicalists. One popular type-A 
strategy is to argue that when Mary leaves her black and white room, she does not gain a new 
piece of factual knowledge after all, but rather a new ability.16 Others have responded to the 
knowledge argument by denying the scrutability assumption, yielding what is known as type-
B physicalism. Type-B physicalists claim that while there is an intimate metaphysical relation 
between mind and body – as it might be, type-identity – there nonetheless exist genuine 
epistemic barriers to acquiring knowledge about the nature of mental state types given only 
the explanatory resources of physical theories. According to type-B physicalism, upon 
leaving her black and white room, Mary does acquire new knowledge regarding what it is 
like to see red, but this knowledge nonetheless concerns some more or less complex 
16 Lewis (1988). 
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 neuroscientific fact. As the saying goes, Mary learns an old fact, but in a new way, or under 
some new mode of presentation.17 
There are important but perhaps underappreciated parallels between the mind-body 
problem and the colour similarity argument. Just as the mind-body problem presents a 
subjective explanatory gap between qualitative features of conscious experience and physical 
features of brain states, so the colour similarity argument presents what Shoemaker (2003: 
254) calls an objective explanatory gap between features of the world that are presented or 
represented in visual experience and features of the world attributed by our best physical 
theories, 
 
[The] objective explanatory gap problem... is in some ways more fundamental and 
certainly of much greater antiquity [than the subjective explanatory gap problem]. 
This is the problem of how colours, given their perceived nature, can be, or be 
realized in, physical properties of things, given what we know about these physical 
properties. This is a central case of the problem Wilfrid Sellars raised by asking how, 
if at all, we can reconcile the “manifest image,” embodied in the common sense view 
of the world and our ordinary experience of it, with the “scientific image.” 
 
Shoemaker (2003: 257-258) continues,  
 
A central part of the objective explanatory gap problem is explaining how it is that 
what are physically very diverse properties can be realisers of the same shade of 
colour, and, more generally, how it is that physical properties can have a similarity 
ordering, qua colour realisers, that bears no apparent relation to any similarity 
relations that would seem salient to someone who was taxonomising them simply as 
physical properties. 
 
17 For an example of such a view, see Loar (1997). See Chalmers (2002) for a detailed taxonomy of the different 
varieties of physicalism. 
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 Johnston (1996: 226) draws a similar comparison, 
 
It is no easier to make intelligible how the colour properties as we represent them 
could be constituted by reflectance profiles then it is to make intelligible how the 
property of being in pain could be constituted by the property of having one's C-fibres 
firing. The [colour physicalist’s] account leaves us with a variant of the mind-body 
problem at the surfaces of objects. 
 
As does Kalderon (2007: 595-96), 
 
The problem of the manifest [i.e. the objective explanatory gap] and the mind-body 
problem are structurally parallel... just as the limitations of what could be known 
solely on the basis of our knowledge of the material world can pose the problem of 
the manifest, so too can these limitations pose the mind-body problem. 
 
In much the same way as the subjective explanatory gap generates problems for physicalist 
views of the metaphysics of mind, so the objective explanatory gap presents the deepest 
puzzle for physicalist views of colour ontology. How could the mind be purely physical in 
nature, given that even complete knowledge of neuroscience seemingly would fail to provide 
us with knowledge of the qualitative character of ordinary conscious experience? How could 
the colours be physical properties such as surface reflectances, given that our best scientific 
accounts of these properties completely fail to account for the characteristic patterns of 
similarity and dissimilarity that we perceive among the colours? 
 As we have seen, the knowledge argument rests on an assumption about the 
scrutability of the mental from the physical, and the colour similarity argument likewise 
depends for its cogency on an assumption about the scrutability of colour similarity facts 
20 
 
 from physical reflectance facts. If you like, Scrutability implies that if colour physicalism 
were true, then Mary should be able to acquire knowledge of all facts about colour structure 
equipped only with knowledge of the facts about reflectances that one can garner from optics, 
plus her apriori deductive capacities. Extending the terminology introduced above, colour 
physicalists who accept Scrutability can be termed type-A colour physicalists and those who 
deny it type-B colour physicalists. In its starkest form, then, my proposal is that colour 
physicalists should be type-B rather than type-A. Like their mind-body cousins, type-B 
colour physicalists hold that while there is an intimate metaphysical relation between the 
colours and the reflectances – as it happens, type-identity – there nonetheless exist genuine 
epistemic barriers to acquiring knowledge about the structural features of colour properties 
given only the descriptive, representational, and explanatory resources of optics. On this 
view, when Mary visually perceives blue, purple, and green, she is able to acquire knowledge 
regarding their comparative similarities that could not be acquired given even a complete 
knowledge of optics. The knowledge that Mary acquires nonetheless concerns some more or 
less complex physical fact. To coin a saying, in perceiving these colours for the first time, 
Mary would learn an old fact about their comparative similarities, but in a new way, or under 
some new mode of presentation. 
 Type-B colour physicalism implies that there exist genuine physical facts regarding 
colour similarities that are not evident under standard physical representations of these 
properties. One might wonder, however, whether structural facts about reflectance properties 
that cannot be learned by consulting optics truly deserve the title ‘physical’. This issue forms 





 So the physicalist might reply by denying [Scrutability]. He might say that, although 
colours are physical properties, some genuine respects of similarity between them can 
only be detected by vision. Put another way, although the colours do not stand in the 
intuitive genuine similarity relations qua physical properties, they do stand in these 
relations qua visible properties. Thus, according to this reply, there is a sense in which 
the nature of certain physical properties is not wholly physical, and so the view is 
more a kind of dual aspect theory than full-blooded physicalism. For this reason, I 
shall not explore this reply further. 
 
Summarising somewhat, Byrne’s objection is that by denying Scrutability, the colour 
physicalist would surrender any claim to being a genuinely reductive theory, and would 
thereby find herself in the mire of a dualist theory of colour structure.18 
 In evaluating this objection, we should note that the charge of closet property dualism 
can also be levelled against type-B physicalism about the mental. The type-B response to the 
knowledge argument is that upon leaving her black and white room, Mary learns an old 
physical fact about brain processing, but in a new way, or under some new mode of 
presentation. One might object, however, that having a new way of knowing, or some new 
mode of presentation of a fact, surely implies the existence of some new property that is 
being presented. As Block (2007: 6) puts it, the worry then is that ‘when [Mary] acquires a 
subjective concept of the property that she used to have only an objective concept of, a new 
unreduced subjective property is required to “pin down” the old objective property.’ The 
details of this debate are well beyond the scope of this paper. The point of the comparison, 
however, is to establish a sort of good company response to Byrne’s objection. In the fullness 
of time, the type-B colour physicalist can adapt and apply strategies already developed by 
type-B mental physicalists in responding to this issue, and to that extent I believe can be 
confident of mounting a defence against the property dualism objection.19 
18 Thanks to Alex Byrne for confirming the accuracy of this interpretation in personal correspondence. 
19 See Block (2007) for relevant discussion and White (2007) for objections. 
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  Having presented some initial context and motivation for the inscrutability response, 
we can now fully appreciate the benefits of the view by comparing it with the experiential 
response. Rather satisfyingly, the inscrutability response retains all of the advantages of the 
experiential response while avoiding the problems that led to its demise. Like the experiential 
response, the inscrutability response allows us to retain commonsense objective realism about 
the colours and thus avoids a perceptual error theory. Somewhat interestingly, the 
inscrutability response also allows us to respect the plausible thought that facts about colour 
structure surely depend in some sense on the nature of our visual systems. Whereas the 
experiential view took this dependence to be metaphysical or constitutive, the inscrutability 
response posits a specific and limited sort of epistemic dependence. On this view, there exist 
some structural facts about the colours that, although not evident under physical theoretical 
descriptions of these properties, are nonetheless evident or knowable on the basis of ordinary 
visual perception of colour. The inscrutability response also avoids the three major problems 
for the experiential response noted above. On the epistemic front, the inscrutability response 
holds that our knowledge of facts about colour structure derives primarily from our visual 
perception of the colours themselves, and not from introspection on the character of our 
visual experiences, exactly as one should expect. On the linguistic front, the inscrutability 
response retains Simple Truth Conditions and thus respects our commonsense view of the 
content of colour similarity claims. On the metaphysical front, the inscrutability response 
situates second-order structural and relational features of the colours as mind- and response-
independent features of the surfaces of objects, exactly as they intuitively seem to be. What 
more could one ask for? 
6. Chemistry, Biochemistry, and the Presentation Sensitivity of Knowledge 
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 In this final section, I shall present some additional, independent, reasons to adopt the 
inscrutability response, deriving from more general considerations regarding the presentation 
sensitivity of knowledge of similarity. As everyone knows, all knowledge is presentation 
sensitive.20 I can know that Dame Edna is glamorous while disbelieving that Barry 
Humphreys is glamorous, even though Barry Humphreys is Dame Edna. Knowledge of 
similarities among properties is no exception, of course. Suppose that blue is Cameron’s 
favourite colour, purple is Brown’s favourite colour, and green is Blair’s favourite colour. 
While it is common knowledge that blue is more similar to purple than green, absenting 
auxiliary knowledge of the chromatic preferences of Cameron, Brown, and Blair, I am not in 
a position to know that Cameron’s favourite colour is more similar to Brown’s favourite 
colour than Blair’s favourite colour. As presented under these descriptions, the comparative 
similarities among the colours blue, purple, and green are simply not evident to me. 
It is obviously implausible, then, to think that colour similarities should be evident or 
knowable under all presentations of these properties. In evaluating Scrutability, however, we 
need to consider whether it is nevertheless plausible to expect that colour similarities should 
be evident under all presentations of a very particular and privileged sort: namely, canonical 
physical representations of surface reflectances such as the spectral reflectance curves 
employed in optics. Does this principle generalise? That is, do successful inter-theoretic 
reductions on the whole guarantee that genuine similarities among the reduced kinds will be 
evident under representations of those kinds at the reducing level? 
20 The following discussion has been inspired and informed by Williamson’s (1990) discussion of the 
presentation sensitivity of discrimination, the acquisition of knowledge of distinctness. ‘Presentation’ is to be 
understood here in a broad and inclusive way. A single property type (scarlet) can be presented by terms 
(‘scarlet’), linguistic descriptions (‘the colour of my armchair’), and visual perceptual states (my state of 
visually perceiving the colour of my armchair), but can also be presented simply by its instances at particular 
places and times (my armchair). 
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 It is relatively straightforward to show that not all genuine similarities among reduced 
kinds are evident under all presentations of those kinds at the reducing level. Here is an 
example from chemistry. Many people would judge intuitively that there is some genuine 
sense in which diamonds are more similar to sapphires than coal. It is presumably 
uncontroversial that these kinds are type-identical to chemical compounds: diamond and coal 
are allotropes of carbon – tetrahedrally bonded and amorphous carbon, respectively – and 
sapphire is a form of aluminium oxide. Hence chemical representations of these compounds 
would constitute standard, canonical, ways of representing diamond, sapphire, and coal at the 
reducing level. One common way of representing these compounds is by their chemical or 
molecular formulae, which represent facts about the type and number of atoms constituting 
each compound. Under these presentations, however, it is not at all evident that diamond is 
more similar to sapphire than coal. On the contrary, relative to the respects of comparison 
made evident by their chemical formulae, we would have reason to think that diamond is 
more similar to coal than sapphire. 
Now of course, this is not to say that the intuitive similarity between diamond and 
sapphire is not evident under any chemical presentation. Another standard way of presenting 
chemical compounds is by their structural formulae, which additionally represent the type of 
bonding between atoms. Unlike their molecular formulae, the structural formulae for 
diamond, sapphire, and coal would make evident the noted similarity between diamond and 
sapphire. There are other cases, however, in which genuine chemical similarities are evident 
under neither molecular nor structural formulae. For example, stereoisomers are compounds 
with exactly the same atomic composition and bond structure but different geometrical 
profiles. Geometrical differences in the relative rotation of bonded atoms can affect the 
potential energy of a compound. Similarities or dissimilarities in potential energy would not 
be evident or predictable from the structural or molecular formulae for stereoisomers, as these 
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 do not represent the spatial position of atoms within molecules. Chemists accordingly have 
developed different ways of representing compounds that are better suited to predicting such 
similarities. For example, in addition to representing chemical bonds, Newman projections 
also represent the angles between atoms, which are a crucial determinant of potential energy. 
The issue simply iterates, however, for it is certain that there will be other genuine chemical 
similarities that are not evident under any of the representations mentioned above.21 In any 
case, it seems clear that given any genuine chemical similarity, there will be at least some 
theoretical presentation of the relevant chemical compounds under which that similarity will 
not be evident. 
The conclusion of the last paragraph takes us some way to our destination, but the key 
issue at hand is whether there exist similarities between indisputably physical kinds that are 
not evident under any standard reductive representations of those kinds. In tackling this issue, 
I want to consider the case of reductions between biochemistry and chemistry. Biochemistry 
is the study of the chemical structures and processes involved in biological activities such as 
digestion and cell creation or duplication. Biochemistry groups or classifies chemical 
compounds according to their biological activities; more specifically, according to the ways 
in which these compounds interact or bond with biological macromolecules or biomolecules, 
the proteins, nucleic acids, carbohydrates, and lipids that make up living cells. Let’s call these 
groupings biochemical-types. These biologically inspired kinds might be quite uninteresting 
from the perspective of a structural chemist, but this does not mean that they are any less 
21 One only need peruse the vast literature on quantum similarity measures, (for example, Carbo-Dorca & 
Mezey (1996)), to appreciate the variety and complexity of representations developed to reflect aspects of 
chemical structural similarity. 
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 chemical in nature.22 Even if no biomolecules had existed, there still would have been 
biochemical-types. 
Biochemical-types stand in distinctive relations of biochemical similarity and 
dissimilarity. As an initial gloss, the biochemical similarity of two molecules is determined 
by their relative biological activity, particularly the ways in which the molecules interact and 
bond with biomolecules. Biochemical similarity ought not to be confused with mere 
similarity in respect of biological effects or responses, however, which would make it an 
entirely extrinsic matter. As it is understood here, the biochemical similarity of two 
molecules rather is determined by complex aggregations of intrinsic chemical features, such 
as their geometrical and topological features, functional groupings, and overall molecular 
size, which determine the bonds that will form between the molecule and biological 
macromolecules. To put this point in terms of supervenience, there could be no difference in 
the comparative biochemical similarity of two compounds without some difference in their 
underlying chemical structure. 
Now, crucially, there exist some biochemical similarities between compounds that are 
not evident under any standard chemical structural descriptions or representations of those 
compounds. This fact has appeared in the literature in discussing apparent violations of one 
of the fundamental assumptions of biochemistry known as the ‘structure-activity 
relationship’, described by Kubinyi (1998: 225) as follows, 
 
The underlying concept is that chemical similarity is reflected by similar biological 
activities – i.e. chemically closely related analogues should be related in their mode of 
22 Important aspects of chemical structure are molecular constitution, configuration, and conformation. 
Constitution relates to the manner and sequence of bonding between atoms in a molecule. Configuration 
concerns the 3D arrangement of atoms in the molecule, particularly the valence angles of atoms as discussed 
above in connection with stereoisomers. Conformation relates to the thermodynamically stable spatial 
arrangements of atoms within a molecule. 
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 action, as well as in their relative potencies. This fundamental assumption has, indeed, 
been used in medicinal chemistry research, and has led to many valuable drugs. 
 
The assumption, then, is that the comparative biochemical similarity of two molecules will be 
predictable or evident under some presentation of the chemical structure of those molecules. 
There are seemingly many cases, however, in which genuine biochemical similarities are not 
at all evident under such reductive presentations of the relevant kinds.23 Nikolova and 
Jaworska (2003: 1016) report that ‘several surprising structure-activity relationships 
demonstrate that chemically similar compounds may have significantly different biological 
actions and activities and different molecules can be very similar in their biological 
activities...’ Bajorath (2002: 890) refers to such cases as ‘similarity paradoxes’, whereby 
‘minor chemical modifications of otherwise similar molecules can render them 
[biochemically] either active or inactive’.  
 Bringing the discussion back to the inscrutability response, there are instructive 
parallels between the biochemist’s unsuccessful attempts to recover all biochemical 
similarities at the level of chemical structural descriptions, on the one hand, and the colour 
physicalist’s inability to find evidence for colour similarities at the level of optical 
representations of reflectance properties, on the other. As we have seen, both the biochemist 
and the colour physicalist group or classify underlying chemical or physical kinds in ways 
that reflect their particular theoretical interests – understanding biological processes in the 
former case, and human colour vision abilities in the latter – yielding biochemical-types and 
reflectance-types respectively. Both of these categories are perfectly objective, response-
independent, chemical or physical kinds, and are not constituted by relations to biological or 
perceptual effects. Recalling Byrne and Hilbert’s (2003: 11) comments, however, reflectance-
23 For example, Kubinyi (1998: 228) and (2002: 244) reports that ‘the [biochemical] selectivity of these 




                                                 
 types ‘will be quite uninteresting from the point of view of physics or any other branch of 
science unconcerned with the reactions of human perceivers,’ and the same could be said, 
mutatis mutandis, regarding the structural chemist’s disinterest in biochemical-types. Now, 
generalising on the foregoing discussion of biochemical similarity, we have good reason to 
think that not all similarities that are characteristic of such interest-relative (but nonetheless 
fully objective and response-independent) kinds will be evident under reductive descriptions 
or presentations of their underlying physical bases. Rather it seems that some similarities of 
this sort will only become evident once these kinds enter into the relations that endow them 
with human interest, such as biological interactions in the case of biochemical kinds, and 
visual perceptual relations in the case of the colours. This does not make these similarities 
any less physical, that is, any less dependent on the physical or chemical nature of the kinds 
in question. These inscrutability phenomena simply seem to reflect a quite general feature of 
our knowledge of similarities among such interest-relative physical kinds. In denying 
Scrutability, then, the type-B colour physicalist is in much the same position as the 
biochemist who rightly maintains her reductive view of biochemical-types in the face of the 
biochemical similarity paradoxes. 
Before concluding the paper, it is necessary to note a complication with the above 
account. I have argued that some biochemical similarities are not evident under any standard 
chemical structural descriptions of the relevant biochemical-types. This conclusion has in 
turn provided some justification for the inscrutability response to the colour similarity 
argument. It is not strictly accurate, however, to say that biochemical similarities are not 
evident under any chemical descriptions whatsoever. The so-called similarity paradoxes in 
biochemistry have triggered a cottage industry in developing representations that capture the 
patterns or regularities in chemical structure most relevant to biological activity, and which 
are thus better suited to predicting biochemical similarity. Kubinyi (1998: 249) calls these 
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 ‘target-dependent’ descriptions, as contrasted with the ‘target-independent’ descriptions 
geared towards understanding chemical structure in its own right.24 This raises the question 
as to whether analogous ‘target-dependent’ descriptions of surface reflectance properties 
might, after all, make ordinary colour similarities evident at the reducing level. This line of 
inquiry certainly seems promising, and might eventually prove fruitful.25 Even if this 
ultimately proved possible, however, this would not undermine the central point of the 
inscrutability response, which is to deny the heretofore unarticulated assumption that colour 
physicalism requires all ordinary colour similarities to be evident under standard or 
canonical physical representations of reflectances such as the spectral reflectance curves 
presented in Figure 1. This was the assumption that we have seen to lie behind Reflectance 
Dissimilarity*, and in rejecting it the colour physicalist acquires an indirect but forceful and 
novel response to the colour similarity argument. 
Conclusion 
In many people’s eyes, the colour similarity argument poses the greatest threat to colour 
physicalism. This paper started out by presenting a challenge to standard formulations of the 
colour similarity argument, centring on the extreme context sensitivity of the similarity 
relation. Although ultimately inconclusive, the context challenge forced a significant 
reformulation of the argument, and highlighted the need for considerably greater care in 
handling claims about similarity. After presenting some problems for the popular experiential 
response to the colour similarity argument, I turned to my own inscrutability response. This 
response begins with the observation that the motivation for the premise Reflectance 
24 See also Patterson et al. (1996: 3049) on so-called ‘pharmacophoric descriptors’. The complex aggregations 
of chemical features represented by such descriptors are selected specifically on the basis of their ability to 
predict biological activity. 
25 One could perhaps view Byrne & Hilbert’s (2003: 15) hue magnitudes response to the colour similarity 
argument along these lines. Very roughly, this response sketches a way of representing reflectance-types that 
reflects the opponent coding employed by the colour vision system. I hope to discuss this approach in more 
detail in forthcoming work. 
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 Dissimilarity* rests on an epistemic assumption regarding the scrutability of colour similarity 
from standard physical descriptions of surface reflectance properties. In rejecting this 
assumption, the inscrutability response provides an indirect route to rejecting Reflectance 
Dissimilarity*, a strategy that has not been attempted by colour physicalists to date. The 
response was motivated via consideration of analogous manoeuvres executed by type-B 
physicalists in response to the mind-body problem, and by cases in chemistry and 
biochemistry in which related scrutability theses seemingly fail to hold. The resulting view is 
that despite an extremely tight metaphysical relationship between colours and reflectance 
properties, there nonetheless exist genuine epistemic barriers to acquiring knowledge of facts 
about colour structure at the level of the reducing physical theory.26 
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